Meet a KEV deadline
Find CISA KEV due dates that apply to your dependencies, order the work by days remaining, and record a position when a date cannot be met.
The CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue is a security list with a date attached. For US federal agencies under BOD 22-01 it is binding; for everyone else it is the strongest public signal that something is used against real systems.
What has been added
What was added to the KEV catalogue recently?
vulnetix_kev pages the catalogues (limit up to 200):
{
"count": 1247,
"sources": ["CISA", "vulnetix", "enisa", "vulncheck"],
"hasMore": true,
"items": [{
"cveId": "CVE-2026-XXXXX",
"vendor": "Microsoft",
"product": "Windows",
"dateAdded": "2026-08-10T06:01:14Z",
"dueDate": "2026-08-31T00:00:00Z",
"knownRansomware": "Known",
"requiredAction": "Apply mitigations per vendor instructions..."
}]
}
Does it apply to you
For one advisory, vulnetix_kev_status is the direct check. For your whole dependency tree, ask the agent to intersect the catalogue with your manifests:
List the KEV entries added in the last 30 days. For each, check with vulnetix_package_vulns whether
any package in this repository's lockfiles is affected at the installed version.
For a specific advisory against this repository:
/mcp__vulnetix__vulnetix_repo_impact CVE-2026-XXXXX
Order by what is due
Sort by dueDate, not severity. A CVSS 7.5 due in six days outranks a CVSS 9.8 with no deadline.
vulnetix_remediation marks overdue entries:
"kevEntries": [{
"dateAdded": "2021-12-10T00:00:00Z",
"dueDate": "2021-12-24T00:00:00Z",
"daysUntilDue": -1691,
"overdue": true,
"knownRansomwareCampaignUse": "Known"
}]
Close them
/mcp__vulnetix__vulnetix_fix CVE-2026-XXXXX
/mcp__vulnetix__vulnetix_verify_fix CVE-2026-XXXXX
verify_fix re-scans and records the verdict in .vulnetix/memory.yaml, which is the evidence.
When the date cannot be met
vulnetix_workaroundsfor mitigations without a patch.vulnetix_detection_rulesfor detection while exposed./mcp__vulnetix__vulnetix_vex_publishto record the justification as a VEX statement.
A documented, mitigated and monitored exception is defensible. A silent miss is not.