VNX-SEC-077: Mapbox access token
Reports a whole Mapbox public access token (pk.eyJ... with its signature) in any file, excluding secret sk. tokens, placeholders, environment references, minified and test files.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Rule ID | VNX-SEC-077 |
| Severity | High |
| SARIF level | error |
| Kind | secrets |
| Languages | Any file |
| CWE | CWE-798 |
| CAPEC | CAPEC-191 |
| ATT&CK | T1552.001 |
| CWSS vector | CWSS:1.0/TI:H/AP:A/AL:A/IC:N/FC:LT/RP:N/RL:A/AV:I/AS:N/IN:A/SC:A/BI:H/DI:H/EX:H/EC:N/P:H |
| Tags | secrets mapbox credentials |
| Source | internal/sast/rules/vnx-sec-077.rego |
Overview
This rule reports a Mapbox public access token: pk., its base64url payload (eyJ...), a dot and a 22-character signature, quoted, assigned to mapboxgl.accessToken, in a tile URL (?access_token=pk...) or in a .env file. Public tokens are meant for browser code, so the finding asks you to confirm the token is URL- and scope-restricted, and to rotate it if it is not.
Why This Matters
Hardcoded mapbox access token values are routinely scraped by automated bots within minutes of a public push, and then used to access the account, exfiltrate data, or pivot into downstream services. Once the credential is in git history it is permanently in third-party hands.
What Gets Flagged
// FLAGGED
mapboxgl.accessToken = 'pk.eyJ<payload>.<22-character signature>';
# FLAGGED: token in a tile URL
TILE_URL = "https://api.mapbox.com/styles/v1/mapbox/streets-v12/tiles/{z}/{x}/{y}?access_token=pk.eyJ<payload>.<signature>"
Not flagged:
- Secret
sk.tokens, which VNX-SEC-904 reports. - Environment references (
import.meta.env.VITE_MAPBOX_TOKEN) and the barepk.eyJprefix. - Placeholder, truncated or low-entropy tokens.
- Test, fixture, vendored, minified and generated files.
Remediation
- Revoke the leaked credential in the provider’s console immediately.
- Replace with a short-lived alternative, OAuth 2.0 access tokens, IAM role assumption, OIDC federation, wherever the platform supports it.
- Store the new credential in a secrets manager (AWS Secrets Manager, HashiCorp Vault, GitHub Actions secrets, Doppler).
- Audit the provider’s access logs for activity you did not initiate between the leak and the revocation.
- Purge from git history with
git filter-repoor BFG, then re-scan with gitleaks/truffleHog to confirm no other secrets remain. - Enable push protection so future commits are blocked at the developer machine.
References
- CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials
- gitleaks
- truffleHog
- OWASP Credentials Management Cheat Sheet
- MITRE ATT&CK T1552.001 – Credentials In Files
- git-filter-repo
Suppressing this rule
Put a nosec comment on the line, or on line 1 to cover the whole file. Use the comment marker of the file’s language (#, //, -- or ;):
# nosec vnx-sec-077
// nosec vnx-sec-077
Or record an ignore rule: vulnetix ignore add --rule vnx-sec-077 --reason "...". See Suppressing findings.