VNX-SEC-071: GitLab session cookie
Detects captured GitLab session cookie values (_gitlab_session with a 32-hex session id) in any file.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Rule ID | VNX-SEC-071 |
| Severity | Critical |
| SARIF level | error |
| Kind | secrets |
| Languages | Any file |
| CWE | CWE-798 |
| CAPEC | CAPEC-191 |
| ATT&CK | T1552.001 |
| CWSS vector | CWSS:1.0/TI:C/AP:A/AL:A/IC:N/FC:LT/RP:N/RL:A/AV:I/AS:N/IN:A/SC:A/BI:C/DI:H/EX:H/EC:N/P:W |
| Tags | secrets gitlab session credentials |
| Source | internal/sast/rules/vnx-sec-071.rego |
Overview
This rule reports _gitlab_session followed by = (a Cookie header, document.cookie, a curl argument) by a quoted or symbol key and :/=/=> (a cookies dict, hash or object), by a call argument pair (cookies.set("_gitlab_session", "...")) or by a tab (Netscape cookies.txt); or a cookie object whose "name" is _gitlab_session with its "value" on the same line or up to 12 lines below, as browser cookie exports write it; and then a 32-character lowercase hexadecimal session id. The value is masked in the snippet.
It does not report the cookie name on its own (Rails session_store key: "_gitlab_session"), a value read from a variable or the environment, placeholder values (all zeros, xxxx...), and generated, vendored and test-suffixed files.
What Gets Flagged
curl -s -H "Cookie: _gitlab_session=<32 hex>" https://gitlab.acme-corp.io/api/v4/projects
cookies = {"_gitlab_session": "<32 hex>"}
Not flagged:
cookies = {"_gitlab_session": os.environ["GITLAB_SESSION"]}
Why This Matters
Hardcoded gitlab session cookie values are routinely scraped by automated bots within minutes of a public push, and then used to access the account, exfiltrate data, or pivot into downstream services. Once the credential is in git history it is permanently in third-party hands.
Remediation
- Revoke the leaked credential in the provider’s console immediately.
- Replace with a short-lived alternative, OAuth 2.0 access tokens, IAM role assumption, OIDC federation, wherever the platform supports it.
- Store the new credential in a secrets manager (AWS Secrets Manager, HashiCorp Vault, GitHub Actions secrets, Doppler).
- Audit the provider’s access logs for activity you did not initiate between the leak and the revocation.
- Purge from git history with
git filter-repoor BFG, then re-scan with gitleaks/truffleHog to confirm no other secrets remain. - Enable push protection so future commits are blocked at the developer machine.
References
- CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials
- gitleaks
- truffleHog
- OWASP Credentials Management Cheat Sheet
- MITRE ATT&CK T1552.001 – Credentials In Files
- git-filter-repo
Suppressing this rule
Put a nosec comment on the line, or on line 1 to cover the whole file. Use the comment marker of the file’s language (#, //, -- or ;):
# nosec vnx-sec-071
// nosec vnx-sec-071
Or record an ignore rule: vulnetix ignore add --rule vnx-sec-071 --reason "...". See Suppressing findings.