VNX-SEC-070: 1Password secret key / service account

Detects 1Password service account tokens (ops_eyJ...) and account Secret Keys (A3-XXXXXX-...) in any file.

Field	Value
Rule ID	`VNX-SEC-070`
Severity	Critical
SARIF level	`error`
Kind	`secrets`
Languages	Any file
CWE	CWE-798
CAPEC	CAPEC-191
ATT&CK	T1552.001
CWSS vector	`CWSS:1.0/TI:C/AP:A/AL:A/IC:N/FC:LT/RP:N/RL:A/AV:I/AS:N/IN:A/SC:A/BI:C/DI:H/EX:H/EC:N/P:W`
Tags	`secrets` `1password` `credentials`
Source	`internal/sast/rules/vnx-sec-070.rego`

Overview

This rule reports a 1Password service account token (ops_eyJ followed by at least 50 base64url characters, the value OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN holds) or an account Secret Key (A3-XXXXXX-XXXXXX-XXXXX-XXXXX-XXXXX-XXXXX, and the older A3-XXXXXX-XXXXXXXXXXX-XXXXX-XXXXX-XXXXX layout, with both letters and digits) in any file. The credential is masked in the snippet.

It does not report the bare ops_eyJ prefix in token checks, truncated examples (ops_eyJ...), CI secret references (${{ secrets.OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN }}), A3- strings of another layout or with an all-digit body (paper sizes, SKUs, batch numbers), placeholder runs, and generated, vendored and test-suffixed files.

What Gets Flagged

OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN=ops_eyJ<base64 JSON>

secret_key: A3-<6>-<6>-<5>-<5>-<5>-<5>

Not flagged:

env:
  OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN }}

Why This Matters

Hardcoded 1password secret key / service account values are routinely scraped by automated bots within minutes of a public push, and then used to access the account, exfiltrate data, or pivot into downstream services. Once the credential is in git history it is permanently in third-party hands.

Remediation

Revoke the leaked credential in the provider’s console immediately.
Replace with a short-lived alternative, OAuth 2.0 access tokens, IAM role assumption, OIDC federation, wherever the platform supports it.
Store the new credential in a secrets manager (AWS Secrets Manager, HashiCorp Vault, GitHub Actions secrets, Doppler).
Audit the provider’s access logs for activity you did not initiate between the leak and the revocation.
Purge from git history with git filter-repo or BFG, then re-scan with gitleaks/truffleHog to confirm no other secrets remain.
Enable push protection so future commits are blocked at the developer machine.

References

Suppressing this rule

Put a nosec comment on the line, or on line 1 to cover the whole file. Use the comment marker of the file’s language (#, //, -- or ;):

# nosec vnx-sec-070
// nosec vnx-sec-070

Or record an ignore rule: vulnetix ignore add --rule vnx-sec-070 --reason "...". See Suppressing findings.