VNX-SEC-058: Notion API token
Reports a hard-coded Notion integration token (ntn_ + 11 digits + 35 alphanumerics, or a legacy secret_ token in a file that names Notion), but not bare prefixes, placeholders or tokens read from the environment.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Rule ID | VNX-SEC-058 |
| Severity | Critical |
| SARIF level | error |
| Kind | secrets |
| Languages | Any file |
| CWE | CWE-798 |
| CAPEC | CAPEC-191 |
| ATT&CK | T1552.001 |
| CWSS vector | CWSS:1.0/TI:C/AP:A/AL:A/IC:N/FC:LT/RP:N/RL:A/AV:I/AS:N/IN:A/SC:A/BI:C/DI:H/EX:H/EC:N/P:W |
| Tags | secrets notion credentials |
| Source | internal/sast/rules/vnx-sec-058.rego |
Overview
This rule reports a Notion integration token written into a file: the current format ntn_ + 11 digits + 35 alphanumerics anywhere, and the legacy internal-integration format secret_ + 43 alphanumerics only when the file mentions Notion, because secret_ alone is too common a prefix. Each token must stand alone and have enough entropy to be real. The snippet is redacted.
It does not report bare prefixes in a prefix check, placeholder or low-entropy bodies, secret_ identifiers in files unrelated to Notion, tokens read from the environment, or test, fixture and vendored paths.
What Gets Flagged
// FLAGGED: token passed to the SDK
const notion = new Client({ auth: "ntn_<11 digits><35 alphanumerics>" });
# FLAGGED: legacy internal-integration secret in a Notion client
notion = Client(auth="secret_<43 alphanumerics>")
// NOT FLAGGED: read from the environment
export const notion = new Client({ auth: process.env.NOTION_TOKEN });
Why This Matters
Hardcoded notion api token values are routinely scraped by automated bots within minutes of a public push, and then used to access the account, exfiltrate data, or pivot into downstream services. Once the credential is in git history it is permanently in third-party hands.
Remediation
- Revoke the leaked credential in the provider’s console immediately.
- Replace with a short-lived alternative, OAuth 2.0 access tokens, IAM role assumption, OIDC federation, wherever the platform supports it.
- Store the new credential in a secrets manager (AWS Secrets Manager, HashiCorp Vault, GitHub Actions secrets, Doppler).
- Audit the provider’s access logs for activity you did not initiate between the leak and the revocation.
- Purge from git history with
git filter-repoor BFG, then re-scan with gitleaks/truffleHog to confirm no other secrets remain. - Enable push protection so future commits are blocked at the developer machine.
References
- CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials
- gitleaks
- truffleHog
- OWASP Credentials Management Cheat Sheet
- MITRE ATT&CK T1552.001 – Credentials In Files
- git-filter-repo
Suppressing this rule
Put a nosec comment on the line, or on line 1 to cover the whole file. Use the comment marker of the file’s language (#, //, -- or ;):
# nosec vnx-sec-058
// nosec vnx-sec-058
Or record an ignore rule: vulnetix ignore add --rule vnx-sec-058 --reason "...". See Suppressing findings.