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VNX-SEC-057: Grafana API / service account token

Reports a hard-coded Grafana service account token (glsa_), Grafana Cloud access policy token (glc_eyJ...) or legacy Grafana API key (eyJrIjoi...), but not bare prefixes, placeholders, ordinary JWTs or tokens read from the environment.

Updated 02 Nov 2026Checked against cli@de9b52a
Field Value
Rule ID VNX-SEC-057
Severity Critical
SARIF level error
Kind secrets
Languages Any file
CWE CWE-798
CAPEC CAPEC-191
ATT&CK T1552.001
CWSS vector CWSS:1.0/TI:C/AP:A/AL:A/IC:N/FC:LT/RP:N/RL:A/AV:I/AS:N/IN:A/SC:A/BI:C/DI:H/EX:H/EC:N/P:W
Tags secrets grafana monitoring credentials
Source internal/sast/rules/vnx-sec-057.rego

Overview

This rule reports a Grafana credential written into a file: a service account token (glsa_ + 32 alphanumerics + _ + 8 hex), a Grafana Cloud access policy token (glc_ followed by its base64 JSON body, glc_eyJ...), or a legacy Grafana API key (the base64 of {"k":", eyJrIjoi..., 70+ characters). Each token must stand alone rather than sit inside a longer identifier, and must have enough entropy to be real. The snippet is redacted.

It does not report bare prefixes in a prefix check, placeholder bodies (xxxx, 0000, YOUR_TOKEN), ordinary JWTs (eyJhbGci...), tokens read from the environment, or test, fixture and vendored paths.

What Gets Flagged

// FLAGGED: service account token in a client config
return gapi.New("https://grafana.acme.internal", gapi.Config{
	APIKey: "glsa_<32 alphanumerics>_<8 hex>",
})
# FLAGGED: Grafana Cloud access policy token in Terraform
cloud_access_policy_token = "glc_eyJ<base64 body>=="
# NOT FLAGGED: read from the environment
token = os.environ["GRAFANA_SA_TOKEN"]

Why This Matters

Hardcoded grafana api / service account token values are routinely scraped by automated bots within minutes of a public push, and then used to access the account, exfiltrate data, or pivot into downstream services. Once the credential is in git history it is permanently in third-party hands.

Remediation

  1. Revoke the leaked credential in the provider’s console immediately.
  2. Replace with a short-lived alternative, OAuth 2.0 access tokens, IAM role assumption, OIDC federation, wherever the platform supports it.
  3. Store the new credential in a secrets manager (AWS Secrets Manager, HashiCorp Vault, GitHub Actions secrets, Doppler).
  4. Audit the provider’s access logs for activity you did not initiate between the leak and the revocation.
  5. Purge from git history with git filter-repo or BFG, then re-scan with gitleaks/truffleHog to confirm no other secrets remain.
  6. Enable push protection so future commits are blocked at the developer machine.

References

Suppressing this rule

Put a nosec comment on the line, or on line 1 to cover the whole file. Use the comment marker of the file’s language (#, //, -- or ;):

# nosec vnx-sec-057
// nosec vnx-sec-057

Or record an ignore rule: vulnetix ignore add --rule vnx-sec-057 --reason "...". See Suppressing findings.

Edit this pageSources: cli/internal/sast/rules/vnx-sec-057.rego, cli/internal/sast/docs/vnx-sec-057.md
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