VNX-RUST-008: Rust path traversal in Actix-web or Axum file-serving handler

Field	Value
Rule ID	VNX-RUST-008
Severity	High
SARIF level	error
Kind	sast
Languages	Rust
CWE	CWE-22
CAPEC	CAPEC-126
ATT&CK	T1083
CWSS vector	CWSS:1.0/TI:H/AP:A/AL:A/IC:N/FC:LT/RP:N/RL:A/AV:I/AS:N/IN:A/SC:A/BI:H/DI:H/EX:H/EC:N/P:H
Tags	path-traversal rust actix axum
Source	internal/sast/rules/vnx-rust-008.rego

Overview

This rule flags Rust web handlers (using Actix-web or Axum) that construct a filesystem path by joining a base directory with a value extracted from a URL path parameter, without subsequently calling canonicalize() and verifying that the result is a child of the expected base directory. When a user-supplied path component is joined directly, an attacker can embed ../ sequences to escape the intended directory and request arbitrary files from the server’s filesystem.

The rule follows a value taken from the request (a Path(name), Path((a, b)), Query(q), Json or Form extractor, a web::Path<...> / web::Query<...> parameter, or HttpRequest::match_info()), directly or through one let binding, into a path or file operation in the same handler: .join(...), Path::new, PathBuf::from, File::open/create, std::fs or tokio::fs calls, NamedFile::open, ServeFile::new or OpenOptions. It does not report a handler that canonicalizes and checks starts_with, rejects "..", keeps only file_name(), checks Component::ParentDir, or calls a sanitize/safe_join helper, nor integer, bool or Uuid extractors. Flows through more than one intermediate binding or across functions are not followed.

This rule corresponds to CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (‘Path Traversal’).

Why This Matters

Path traversal vulnerabilities in file-serving endpoints are straightforward to exploit and can have severe consequences. An attacker does not need to compromise the server or find an authentication bypass, they simply send a crafted URL to an endpoint that was intended for legitimate file access.

A typical attack begins with the attacker sending a request like GET /files/../../../../etc/passwd or the URL-encoded equivalent %2e%2e%2f sequences. If the handler blindly joins the base directory with this value, the resolved path escapes the intended directory. On a Linux server, common high-value targets include /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, application configuration files containing database credentials, private TLS key files, and cloud instance metadata accessible via well-known paths.

In microservice architectures, the file server may run alongside services whose configuration files contain secrets for databases, message queues, or cloud providers. A path traversal vulnerability in the file-serving handler can expose the credentials of entirely unrelated services on the same host.

What Gets Flagged

The finding is reported on the line where the request value reaches the path or file operation.

// FLAGGED: user path joined directly, no canonicalization
async fn serve_file(Path(filename): Path<String>) -> impl Responder {
    let base = PathBuf::from("/var/www/files");
    let path = base.join(&filename); // ../../etc/passwd escapes base
    match tokio::fs::read(&path).await {
        Ok(data) => HttpResponse::Ok().body(data),
        Err(_) => HttpResponse::NotFound().finish(),
    }
}

// FLAGGED: inline format argument names the file
async fn logs(service: web::Path<String>) -> HttpResponse {
    let service = service.into_inner();
    let body = std::fs::read_to_string(format!("/var/log/app/{service}.log"));
    ...
}

// FLAGGED: Axum handler with unvalidated path join
async fn download(axum::extract::Path(name): axum::extract::Path<String>) -> Vec<u8> {
    let p = std::path::Path::new("/srv/data").join(&name);
    tokio::fs::read(p).await.unwrap()
}

Remediation

1. Canonicalize the resolved path and verify it starts with the base directory. canonicalize() resolves all .. components and symlinks, and starts_with() then confirms the result is within the intended tree:

// SAFE: canonicalize + starts_with prevents traversal
async fn serve_file(Path(filename): Path<String>) -> impl Responder {
    let base = PathBuf::from("/var/www/files").canonicalize().unwrap();
    let requested = base.join(&filename);

    let resolved = match requested.canonicalize() {
        Ok(p) => p,
        Err(_) => return HttpResponse::NotFound().finish(),
    };

    if !resolved.starts_with(&base) {
        return HttpResponse::Forbidden().finish();
    }

    match tokio::fs::read(&resolved).await {
        Ok(data) => HttpResponse::Ok().body(data),
        Err(_) => HttpResponse::NotFound().finish(),
    }
}

2. Strip or reject .. components before joining. For simpler cases, reject any filename that contains a path separator or ..:

// SAFE: reject filenames with path components
async fn serve_file(Path(filename): Path<String>) -> impl Responder {
    if filename.contains('/') || filename.contains("..") {
        return HttpResponse::BadRequest().finish();
    }
    let path = PathBuf::from("/var/www/files").join(&filename);
    // ...
}

3. Serve files from an index rather than a direct path. Map user-visible identifiers to server-side paths in a database or in-memory map, eliminating the need to accept arbitrary filesystem paths from users entirely.

References

• CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory
• CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
• OWASP Path Traversal
• Rust std::path::Path::canonicalize documentation
• Actix-web Extractors documentation
• Axum Path extractor documentation

Suppressing this rule

Put a nosec comment on the line, or on line 1 to cover the whole file. Use the comment marker of the file’s language (#, //, -- or ;):

# nosec vnx-rust-008
// nosec vnx-rust-008

Or record an ignore rule: vulnetix ignore add --rule vnx-rust-008 --reason "...". See Suppressing findings.