VNX-602: Server trusts a client-supplied role or admin flag
Reports server code (Express/Koa, Django/Flask, PHP) that bases an authorisation decision on a role or admin flag taken from the request body, query, URL parameters, headers or unsigned cookies.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Rule ID | VNX-602 |
| Severity | Medium |
| SARIF level | warning |
| Kind | sast |
| Languages | JavaScript / TypeScript, Python, PHP |
| CWE | CWE-602 |
| CAPEC | CAPEC-66 |
| ATT&CK | T1190 |
| CWSS vector | CWSS:1.0/TI:M/AP:RU/AL:S/IC:N/FC:LT/RP:RU/RL:S/AV:L/AS:N/IN:A/SC:A/BI:M/DI:H/EX:M/EC:N/P:C |
| Tags | authorization client-side-enforcement trust-boundary cwe-602 |
| Source | internal/sast/rules/vnx-602.rego |
Overview
VNX-602 maps to CWE-602: Client-Side Enforcement of Server-Side Security. When the server checks a value the client sent, the client is the one enforcing the policy, and it can send whatever passes.
The rule reports a comparison, condition or ternary on a request value named for a role or privilege (admin, isAdmin, is_admin, role, user_role, X-User-Role, isAuthenticated, loggedIn, authorized, privileges, accessLevel, userType, permissions, isStaff, superuser), either directly or through a variable assigned from it within the 15 lines above. Sources: req.body, req.query, req.params, req.headers, req.cookies (Express/Koa); request.COOKIES, GET, POST, args, form, cookies, headers, json, values, data (Django/Flask); $_COOKIE, $_GET, $_POST, $_REQUEST, $_SERVER (PHP).
It does not report server-held identity (req.user, req.session, request.user, $_SESSION), signed cookies, the Authorization header, presence checks (isset, comparisons with null/undefined/None), a role written to a new record without a decision, browser UI code that reads a user object, or comments and string literals.
What Gets Flagged
if (req.body.isAdmin) { ... } // FLAGGED
if (req.query.role === 'admin') { ... } // FLAGGED
const role = req.cookies.role;
if (role !== 'admin') { return res.status(403).end(); } // FLAGGED
// NOT FLAGGED
if (req.user && req.user.role === 'admin') { ... }
if (req.session.isAdmin) { ... }
if request.POST.get('is_admin') == "1": # FLAGGED
if request.COOKIES.get('admin') == "1": # reported by VNX-784, not VNX-602
if ($_GET['role'] == 'admin') { // FLAGGED
if ($_COOKIE['role'] == 'admin') { // reported by VNX-784, not VNX-602
A privilege or login-state cookie compared or tested on the line that reads it, or assigned there to a variable that a condition uses within 15 lines, is a security decision on a cookie: VNX-784 reports that line, so VNX-602 does not report it again. Body, query, URL-parameter and header values, and the decision line of a cookie read a few lines earlier, stay with VNX-602.
Remediation
- Take the user’s role from the authenticated server-side session or a verified token, never from a field the client sends.
- If a role must travel with the request, sign it (signed cookie, verified JWT claim) and verify the signature before use.
References
Suppressing this rule
Put a nosec comment on the line, or on line 1 to cover the whole file. Use the comment marker of the file’s language (#, //, -- or ;):
# nosec vnx-602
// nosec vnx-602
Or record an ignore rule: vulnetix ignore add --rule vnx-602 --reason "...". See Suppressing findings.