VNX-386: Symbolic Name not Mapping to Correct Object
A Java class is looked up with Class.forName() or ClassLoader.loadClass() by a name assembled at run time (concatenation, String.format, or request data) without an allow-list check.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Rule ID | VNX-386 |
| Severity | Low |
| SARIF level | note |
| Kind | sast |
| Languages | Java |
| CWE | CWE-386 |
| CAPEC | CAPEC-66 |
| ATT&CK | T1190 |
| CWSS vector | CWSS:1.0/TI:L/AP:RU/AL:S/IC:N/FC:LT/RP:RU/RL:S/AV:L/AS:N/IN:A/SC:A/BI:L/DI:H/EX:L/EC:N/P:L |
| Tags | symbolic-name cwe-386 |
| Source | internal/sast/rules/vnx-386.rego |
Overview
VNX-386 maps to CWE-386: Symbolic Name not Mapping to Correct Object. It reports Class.forName() and ClassLoader.loadClass() whose class-name argument is built by concatenation or String.format/formatted with a variable part (also across a line break), or is a variable assigned in the 15 lines above from such an expression or from request data (getParameter, getHeader, getQueryString, getPathInfo, getCookies, readLine).
Not reported: literal class names, ALL_CAPS constants, X.class.getName(), concatenations of literals only, a lookup preceded in the 10 lines above by an allow-list check of the variable (ALLOWED.contains(kind), a validator, matches()), map-based registries of Class objects, comments and string literals. Request-supplied class names are also reported by VNX-470 (unsafe reflection).
Why This Matters
A class name built from data can resolve to a class other than the one intended: any class on the classpath whose name the input can spell, including ones with dangerous constructors or static initialisers.
What Gets Flagged
Class<?> c = Class.forName(BASE + kind + "Plugin"); // FLAGGED
loader.loadClass(String.format("com.acme.codec.%sCodec", format)); // FLAGGED
String renderer = req.getParameter("renderer");
Object r = Class.forName(renderer).getDeclaredConstructor().newInstance(); // FLAGGED
Not flagged: Class.forName("org.postgresql.Driver"), Class.forName(DRIVER_CLASS), a lookup after if (!ALLOWED.contains(kind)) throw ....
Remediation
- Map the input to a fixed set of
Classobjects (aMap<String, Class<?>>or an enum) instead of building a class name. - If a dynamic name is unavoidable, check it against an explicit allow-list before loading it.
References
- CWE-386: Symbolic Name not Mapping to Correct Object
- CWE-470: Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code
Suppressing this rule
Put a nosec comment on the line, or on line 1 to cover the whole file. Use the comment marker of the file’s language (#, //, -- or ;):
# nosec vnx-386
// nosec vnx-386
Or record an ignore rule: vulnetix ignore add --rule vnx-386 --reason "...". See Suppressing findings.